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I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rekindled public debate about
a National Identification Scheme (NIDS) in the United States and in many
other countries throughout the world. As with most other national security
measures enacted since September 11, the proposal of a NIDS involves striking
a balance between security and liberty, therefore generating considerable
debate worldwide. Although the debate is by no means new,' the issue has
resurfaced with vigor in today's age of global terrorism. Feeling the need to
improve identity verification systems and to attempt to curb fraudulent
procurement of identity documents by terrorists, a number of countries
throughout the world have seriously considered the use of a NIDS to improve
national security.2
A. The United Kingdom's Identity Cards Act
The United Kingdom, a country that has been plagued by terrorism long
before the rise of Middle Eastern extremist groups, has recently come up with
a NIDS of its own.3 The United Kingdom has been attacked by terrorists
associated with the Irish Republican Army for decades,4 and has been the
' Approximately one hundred countries around the world currently use national
identification cards. See Simon Davies, Identity Cards: Frequently Asked Questions, PRIVACY
INT'L, Aug. 24, 1996, available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/idcard-faq.html;
DAvID BANISAR ETAL., PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY
LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 27 (2002) ("ID cards are in use in one form or
another in virtually all countries of the world. The type of card, its functions, and integrity vary
enormously. [A] number of countries have official, compulsory national ID cards that are used
for a variety of purposes .. "). Examples of countries with some form of a national ID card
include Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Malaysia and South Africa. Id Other countries,
including the United States, have struggled with the idea ofa NIDS for years. See National ID
Cards andREAL ID Act, ELEC. PRIv. INFO. CTR. (stating that proposals to initiate a NIDS failed
in the United States in 1971, 1976 and 1999), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/id-car
ds/default.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
2 Since September 11, 2001, China, Malaysia and Finland have adopted some variation of
a NIDS. See generally Rina C.Y. Chung, Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy
Issues andImplicationsfor a Post-September 1Ith America, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 518,
562 (2003).
' See Identity Cards Act, 2006, c. 15 (Eng.).
4 For a discussion ofthe United Kingdom's history with the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.),
see Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism: Lessons
from the UnitedKingdom 's Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1997)
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target of a recent Al-Qaeda attack.5 These situations led to a climate in which
security from terrorism is of utmost importance to its citizens. Britain's
Identity Cards Act of 2006 has been termed by some as "the most ambitious
project of its kind and one of the world's largest [information technology]
schemes."6 In essence, the NIDS will require all British subjects over the age
of sixteen to enter personal information into a National Identity Register.7 In
its early stages, only those individuals applying for a passport will be issued
an identification card,' but the British government plans to make the cards,
complete with basic identity information and biometric data, available to all
British subjects as early as 2010.'
B. The Security-Privacy Debate
Implementation of a NIDS raises two fundamental issues: security and
privacy. The use of digital and biometric technology makes a NIDS, such as
the one envisioned by the British Identity Cards Act, a more reliable source of
verification.'" Proponents argue that such systems will make it more difficult
for terrorists to obtain fraudulent forms of identification." Furthermore, by
allowing government agencies to cross-reference information, a NIDS
facilitates watch-lists thereby allowing governments to identify potential
threats to national security.12
("Political violence connected with [The Irish Republican Army] has been a significant and
continuous cause of death and destruction within Great Britain since... 1973.... [Rlegularly
occurring attacks ... have caused over 120 deaths in Britain.").
' On July 7, 2005, an AI-Qaeda affiliated group set off a series of three bombs in the
London subways, killing fifty-two and wounding more than seven hundred. The attacks were
described as the worst in Great Britain since World War II. See Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus
Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,2005, at Al; Jim VandeHei, Bush Defends
Strategy Against Terrorist Attacks; London Bombs Meant to Scare US., President Says, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2005, at A3.
6 Britain's Ambitious ID Card Plan Comes Under Attack, REUTERS NEWS, Aug. 4, 2006.
Identity Cards Act, 2006, c. 15, § 1 (Eng.).
Home Office, How the National Identity Scheme Will Get Started, http://www.ips.gov.uk/
identity/scheme-what-how.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
' Home Office, How to Get Your ID Card and How It Will Be Produced, http://www.ips.
gov.uk/identity/scheme-what-produced.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
0 Neda Matar, Comment, Are You Readyfor a National ID Card? Perhaps We Don't Have
to Choose Between Fear of Terrorism and Needfor Privacy, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 287, 313
(2003).
11 See id.
12 Id. at 313-14.
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On the other hand, a NIDS has serious implications for privacy. The ability
of the government to combine sensitive personal information into one
centralized database raises legitimate concerns about the possibility of
intrusive government surveillance of citizens.13 This objection is reflected in
the appreciative public response to novels such as George Orwell's 1984.4 In
addition to government access to private data, critics fear employers, landlords,
credit agencies, direct mailers and other interested parties will access
information contained in the national databank, further implicating privacy
concerns. 15
The British Identity Cards Act, shaped by tortured debate on these issues,
remains a heated topic of controversy. 6 While advocates claim the scheme is
needed to fight against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration,
critics fear the scheme will ultimately lead to impermissible privacy intrusion
and civil liberties infringements. 7
C. The Privacy Landscape in the United Kingdom
Privacy rights are recognized around the world, 8 and Great Britain is no
exception. Although Great Britain does not have a written constitution, the
right to privacy has been protected by various common law doctrines and
statutes. 19 In most cases, the right to privacy is protected only incidentally to
the protection of some other right or value, and the right to privacy does not
"3 Id. at 308-09; see also American Civil Liberties Union, National ID Cards: 5 Reasons
Why They Should be Rejected, Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/14898res20030
908.html [hereinafter National ID Cards].
14 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (depicting a totalitarian society in which an omnipotent
dictator ("Big Brother") monitors people's thoughts and actions; the term "Big Brother" has
come to refer to a ruler or government that invades the privacy of its citizens).
"5 National ID Cards, supra note 13.
16 Britain's Ambitious ID Card Plan Comes Under Attack, supra note 6; Mark Trevelyan,
British ID Scheme Seen as Key Biometrics Test, REUTERS NEWS, Nov. 23, 2004.
I? Trevelyan, supra note 16.
IS Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Overview, PRIVACY INT'L ("Privacy is recognized
around the world in diverse regions and cultures. It is protected in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in many other
international treaties.... In many countries, international agreements that recognize privacy
rights such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European
Convention on Human Rights have been adopted into law."), available at http://www.privacy
international.org/survey/phr2003/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
'9 See HOME OFFICE, LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, SCOTTISH OFFICE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY 25-28 (1972).
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appear to be the main consideration of such laws.2° Nevertheless, these early
common law doctrines and statutes have provided the groundwork for the
protection of the right to privacy in the United Kingdom.
The greatest protection for privacy in the United Kingdom came in 1998
when Parliament approved two Acts with expansive implications for that right:
the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act.2 The Data Protection Act
covers records held by both government agencies and private entities and sets
limitations on the use of, access to, and maintenance of personal information.22
The Human Rights Act is by far the greatest protection for privacy the United
Kingdom has ever seen. The Act incorporated the European Convention on
Human Rights, an international agreement that includes a specific right to
privacy,23 into domestic law, thus effectively establishing for the first time in
Great Britain an enforceable right to privacy.24
The right to privacy in the United Kingdom is also backed by the force of
public opinion. Although public concern over the right to privacy is not as
strong in Great Britain as in other countries around the world,25 there is, on
some levels, strong public recognition of the right to privacy. In fact, public
opinion regarding the use of national identification cards in the past
demonstrates the public's strong desire to protect the interest of privacy. The
United Kingdom has faced proposals to establish national identity cards in the
past, all failing in the face of public objection.26
20 Id. at 25.
21 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
22 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
23 David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International
Survey ofPrivacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws andDevelopments, 18 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 1, 105 (1999).
24 BANISAR ET AL., supra note 1, at 375.
25 For example, Great Britain has used Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance to monitor its
citizens since 1985, and this practice has not been met with much public resistance or challenge.
See SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEvISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 9 (Clive Norris et al.
eds., 1998) ("[A] s the rise of [Closed Circuit Television] Surveillance easily evokes Orwellian
concerns of Big Brother, we may ask why there has been so little public resistance or
challenge."). In addition, some criminal and public laws have been passed in recent years with
significant implications for the right to privacy. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 23, at 106.
26 National ID Cards and REAL ID Act, supra note 1.
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D. Overview
Given Great Britain's longstanding history and strong public support of
protecting a right to privacy, the legitimacy of the Identity Cards Act is
dubious. Great Britain is faced with serious threats to national security, as are
many other countries around the world, and its interest in providing for the
welfare of its citizens is of utmost importance. Indeed, national security is one
of the greatest duties owed to the citizenry of any country, and should not be
undertaken lightly. However, as this Note demonstrates, a comprehensive
NIDS such as the Identity Cards Act is not the answer. National security,
although perhaps the strongest government interest that might justify
interference with civil liberties, is by no means a blank check to ignore basic
civil rights. Instead, as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in interpreting Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
indicates, the two interests of security and liberty should be weighed against
each other.27
Part I of this Note will discuss the privacy picture in the United Kingdom,
including the various common law doctrines and statutes with privacy
elements, the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act that incorporated the
European Convention of Human Rights into domestic law, as well as public
opinion regarding privacy in general in the United Kingdom. Part II will
discuss in further detail the protections provided by the European Convention
on Human Rights, which has been incorporated into domestic English law.
Part III will explore the various provisions of the Identity Cards Act and
will show the extent to which the Act invades the privacy interest. The Act has
been described as "the most ambitious project of its kind and one of the
world's largest [information technology] schemes."28
Finally, Part IV will analyze the Identity Cards Act under the European
Court of Human Rights. Analysis under the European Court of Human Rights
essentially has four steps: (1) Is there an interference with the privacy
interest?; (2) Is the interference with the privacy interest in accordance with
domestic law?; (3) Does the interference with the privacy interest serve one of
the legitimate aims listed in Article 8.2?; and, (4) Is the interference with the
privacy interest necessary and appropriate to the aim it serves?
27 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc.
28 Britain's Ambitious ID Card Plan Comes Under Attack, supra note 6.
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In conclusion, this Note will demonstrate the utter failure of the Identity
Cards Act to pass European Court of Human Rights muster. Although the
topic will continue to be debated in the United Kingdom, as well as in other
areas throughout the world, national identification systems-at least the one
envisioned by the Identity Cards Act-are dangerous intrusions upon civil
liberties in the name of national security. Countries throughout the world will
face the challenges of balancing security and liberty in the context of
combating terrorism for many years to come. However, no country need
sacrifice the cherished civil liberties it has worked for centuries to develop,
simply to ensure that it will continue to endure in the face of terrorism and
other breaches of national security. The two interests are not mutually
exclusive.
II. PRIVACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. Early Domestic Law
Although there is no per se legal right to privacy in the United Kingdom,
the law does provide privacy protection scattered throughout common law
doctrines and statutes.29 In some of these laws, the protection of privacy is
only incidental to the protection of other rights and values.3" For example, the
common law proscription against trespass to land protects the right to privacy,
but that protection is only secondary to the property right.3 Other laws, such
as defamation, libel, and slander, protect rights that are very similar to and co-
extensive with privacy, such as the control of personal information.32 The
early common law tort of breach of confidence is likely the closest that the
United Kingdom ever came to an outright recognition of the right to privacy33
in controlling the right to use personal information.34 The laws of contract and
copyright also control the use of personal information.35
29 HOME OFFICE, supra note 19, 83, at 25 ("There is no legal right to privacy as such in the
law of England and Wales .... [The protection that the law in Great Britain gives is scattered




33 Id. at 25-26 ("The law on breach of confidence offers the most protection of privacy in
all existing law.").
14 Id. at 25.
35 Id.
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In addition to these common law and statutory tort offenses, Britain's
criminal regulatory scheme includes statutes that afford protection for the right
to privacy.36 The protection is scattered throughout several criminal laws, each
aimed at a particular offense.37 The right to privacy does not appear to have
been the central aim or concern in any of these statutes, but the protection is
afforded nonetheless, even if only incidentally.38 Examples of criminal laws
that protect privacy interests include proscriptions against sending offensive
telephone messages; opening another's mail; sending obscene or indecent
matter through the post; harassing tenants; and harassing debtors.39
Some of the biggest protections of the privacy interest in early United
Kingdom law dealt with the right to acquire and use personal information.4"
As previously mentioned, copyright laws and the laws against breach of
confidence were aimed at the acquisition and use of personal information.4
The Wireless Telegraphy Acts also afforded some protection by criminalizing
the use of wireless telegraphy transmitting apparatus without a license; the use
of wireless telegraphy transmitting apparatus for the interception of non-public
messages; and the import and manufacture of wireless telegraphy transmitting
apparatus."' In certain instances, criminal laws also prohibit the selling of
employee information by employers.43 The laws also protect against industrial
espionage and "bugging" without a wire." 44
B. Changes in the Privacy Landscape-The Data Protection Act and the
Human Rights Act
1. The Data Protection Act
Prior to 1984, legal protection of privacy in the United Kingdom was
relatively sparse and much less protective than the privacy laws of other




39 Id. at 27.
40 See, e.g., id.
41 Id. at 25.
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increased computer use around the 1970s and the accompanying ease with
which groups could rapidly compile information, the United Kingdom
recognized the need for more comprehensive privacy protection.46 Parliament
met that need by passing the first Data Protection Act 1984,"7 one of the first
laws of its kind.4' For the first time, individuals and groups who held personal
data about individuals were required to register with the Office of the Data
Protection Registrar.49 The purpose of the Data Protection Act was to set
limits on the acquisition, use and disbursement of personal information held
by both private entities and government agencies.5" The Data Protection Act
is guided by eight principles for the proper processing of personal data.5 For
example, the information to be contained in personal data shall be obtained,
and personal data shall be processed, fairly and lawfully.52 Furthermore,
personal data shall be held only for one or more specified and lawful purposes,
and personal data held for any purpose shall not be used or disclosed in any
manner incompatible with that purpose.53 Of particular relevance is the
requirement that personal data held for any purpose shall be adequate, relevant,
and not excessive to that purpose.54
Additionally, the Data Protection Act stipulates that an individual shall be
entitled, at reasonable intervals and without undue delay or expense, to certain
rights regarding the data. These rights include the right to be informed of any
data held concerning the individual subject,55 a description of any such data
46 PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 1 (2d
ed. 2004) ("The desirability of data protection legislation arose out of the growing use of
computers in the 1970s and the threat to personal privacy that rapid manipulation of data
potentially posed. In the UK the existing law at that time (which consisted of not much more
than a possible action in breach of confidence) was insufficient to deal with concerns about the
amount of information relating to individuals that was held by organizations in electronic
form.").
47 Data Protection Act, 1984, c. 35 (repealed 1998) (Eng.). The law was later updated and
repassed in 1998. See Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
48 CAREY, supra note 46, at 3.
49 Data Protection Act, 1998, § 17(1).
50 Id. long title.
5 Id. sched. 1, pt. I.
52 Id. sched. 1, pt. I(1).
53 Id. sched. 1, pt. 1(2).
54 Id. sched. 1, pt. 1(3).
55 Id. § 7(1)(a).
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held by a data user," and, where appropriate, to have such data corrected or
erased.57
The Data Protection Act was modified extensively in 1998, largely in
response to a directive of the European Union requiring all Member States to
pass national legislation with regard to the processing of personal data.58 The
principle aims of this European Union directive, known as the Data Protection
Directive, were the "protection of an individual's privacy in relation to the
processing of personal data" and the "harmonization of data protection laws
of the Member States. 59 The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1998,
which was in response to the European Union Data Protection Directive,
changed the regime of the 1984 Act in significant ways.6" For example, new
conditions were imposed for processing." A new category of
information-sensitive personal data-was created, which must not be
processed unless certain conditions are met.62 These sensitive personal data
categories include personal data consisting of information as to-
(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject,
(b) his political opinions,
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature,
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union,
(e) his physical or mental health or condition,
(f) his sexual life,
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offense,
or
(h) any proceedings for any offense committed or alleged to have
been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or
the sentence of any court in such proceedings.63
56 Id. § 7(1)(b)(i).
57 Id. § 14(1).
51 CAREY, supra note 46, at 5.
59 Id. at 6.
60 Id. at 5 ("The new Act... took data protection legislation to a new level of complexity
in the UK.").
61 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 17.
62 Id. § 2.
63 Id.
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The Act also created significantly more and stronger individual rights,
including the right to compensation in cases of unlawful processing.' Other
rights protected in the Data Protection Act 1998 include the right of access to
personal data;65 the prevention of processing likely to cause damage or
distress; 66 the prevention of processing of personal data for direct marketing;
67
the prevention of automated decision-taking; 68 the right to rectification,
blocking, or erasure and destruction of inaccurate personal data;69 and the right
to request assessment. 70 However, the right to individual access is subject to
a considerable number of exemptions, including information relating to
national security, crime, taxation, health, education, social work, and parental
records and reports.7
The Data Protection Principles of the 1998 Data Protection Act are very
similar to the 1984 Act and require personal information to be: (1) fairly and
lawfully processed; (2) processed for limited purposes; (3) adequate, relevant,
and not excessive; (4) accurate; (5) not kept longer than necessary; (6)
processed in accordance with individual rights; (7) kept secure; and, (8) not
transferred without adequate protection.72
2. The Human Rights Act
The Data Protection Act was part of a broader recognition in United
Kingdom law of a need to protect the right to privacy. The Data Protection
Act was accompanied in the same year by another act, the Human Rights Act,
which provided yet another drastic change in the protection of privacy rights.73
The Human Rights Act, by far the greatest protection of privacy rights the
United Kingdom has ever codified, incorporated the European Convention on
Human Rights into domestic law.74 By adopting the European Convention on
Human Rights, an international agreement that includes a specific right to
- Id. § 13.
65 Id. § 7(1)(b)(i).
-Id § 10.
67 Id. § 11.
68 Id. § 12.
69 Id. § 14(1).
70 Id. § 12A(l)(a).
71 Id. §§ 28-30.
72 Id. sched. 1, pt. I.
73 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
74 Id.
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privacy,75 Parliament effectively established, for the first time in Great Britain,
an enforceable right to privacy.76 Passage of the Human Rights Act further
demonstrates a desire by British subjects, and their representatives in
Parliament, to protect the individual right to privacy.
C. Public Opinion
1. Public Support for the Identity Cards Act
Supporters of the Identity Cards Act, including then Prime Minister Tony
Blair and Home Secretary David Blunkett, often cite public support as a
justification for the NIDS scheme.77 Indeed, historical security measures
undertaken by the British government tend to suggest that the British value
security over privacy.78 For example, Great Britain has made use of public
closed circuit television surveillance since 1985."9 According to Privacy
International, a London-based campaign group, and the United States
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Great Britain's security measures since
September 11, 2001 demonstrate a far greater erosion of individual privacy
rights than in any other developed country.80 As the argument goes, since such
drastic measures have been passed with little or no public resistance, it stands
to reason that Britains are more concerned with national security than with
personal privacy, and therefore more likely to approve of national
identification cards. Indeed, early opinion polls reflected this prediction and
7 ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.
76 Human Rights Act, Long Title.
77 Michael Holden, British Lawmakers Criticise Plans for ID Cards, REUTERS NEWS,
July 29, 2004.
71 SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEvISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 25.
79 Id. at 9 ("[A]s the rise of [Closed Circuit Television] Surveillance easily evokes Orwellian
concerns of Big Brother, we may ask why there has been so little public resistance or
challenge."). In addition, some criminal and other public laws have been passed in recent years
with significant implications for the right to privacy. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 23,
at 106.
o David Rowan, Britain "Leads Way' in Eroding Privacy, TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002,
at 16 ("Individual privacy is being eroded in Britain at a far greater pace than in other developed
countries, according to an international study of state surveillance in the year since
September 11 .... In the 400-page report,... Privacy International, a London-based campaign
group, and the US Electronic Privacy Information Center, give warning of a significant loss of
personal freedom. The Privacy and Human Rights survey notes than in many of the 53 countries
studied, communications surveillance has grown, intrusive 'personal profiling' of individuals
has increased, and data protection laws have been watered down.").
2008] 455
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showed strong public support for the scheme."s However, public support has
dwindled overtime, 2 consistent with Great Britain's historical uneasiness with
,national identification cards.
2. Public Response to Previous National Identification Schemes in the
United Kingdom
The struggle over whether to implement a NIDS is not new to the United
Kingdom. 3 Identity cards have been used during wartime, largely as a
temporary measure to combat threats to national security. 4 The first use of
national identity cards was during World War I, but they were abandoned
in 191985 Identity cards resurfaced during World War H under the National
Registration Act of 1939, but were met with public disagreement.8 6 The cards
were officially abandoned in 1952 with the case Willcock v. Muckle, in which
the judge said the cards were an "annoyance" and "tend[ed] to turn law-
abiding subjects into law breakers."" Constrained by the technology of the
81 Martin Hickman, ID Cards Won't Cut Crime, UK Pressure Groups Say, REUTERS NEWS,
Sept. 24,2001 (explaining that aNews of the Worldnewspaper poll reveals 85% of those polled
support the identity cards use); Blunkett Says Wants UK ID Cards in Three Years, REUTERS
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2004 (stating there is 80% popular support for identity card use according to
MORI poll).
82 Natalie Harrison, Poll-Blair Seen Moving over for Brown as Early as 2006, REUTERS
NEWS, May 13, 2005 (" 'They [supporters of I.D. Cards] have this very reduced majority, there
is a large part of the Labour party that [doesn't] support them.. ., the Liberal Democrats are
completely against them. And I think the Conservatives are sceptical.' "); ID Cards "Not a
Panacea "for Terrorism - UK Minister, REUTERS NEWS, Aug. 4, 2005 ("[R]ecent polls show
public support for the scheme is falling.").




85 Id.; Press Release, Univ. of Cambridge, Identity Cards in Britain (Nov. 17, 2005),
available at http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/news/press/dpp/2005111701.
86 History of ID Cards in the United Kingdom, supra note 83.
" Willcock v. Muckle, (1951) 2 K.B. 844, 851 ("[I]t is obvious that the police now, as a
matter of routine, demand the production of national registration identity cards whenever they
stop or interrogate a motorist for whatever cause. Of course, if they are looking for a stolen car
or have reason to believe that a particular motorist is engaged in committing a crime, that is one
thing, but to demand a national registration identity card from all and sundry, for instance, from
a lady who may leave her car outside a shop longer than she should, or some trivial matter of that
sort, is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes, and not for the purposes
for which, apparently, it is now sought to be used. To use Acts of Parliament, passed for
[Vol. 36:443
BIG SUCCESS OR "BIG BROTHER?"
time, both NIDS were paper based and did not involve recording information
through a central database.8 Over the years, failed attempts have been made
to re-establish the card by the tax administration, immigration services, and the
issuers of driver's licenses.89 The latest attempt to introduce a NIDS, in 1995,
was met by particularly strong criticism, including Tony Blair who demanded
that, "instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID
cards ... the money [should] provide thousands more police officers on the
beat in our local communities."90
3. Three Objections to the Identity Cards Act
Although the 2006 Identity Cards Bill essentially met with strong public
support, due to a concern for threats to national security and the need to
improve verification systems and prevent fraud, public support for the scheme
has melted away.9 British subjects have grown uneasy about the national
identification scheme for three basic reasons. First, people have begun to
realize exactly how much identification cards would cost them.92 In October
2006, the British government announced that the entire scheme would cost an
estimated 5.4 billion pounds ($10.08 billion) over the next ten years.93
Second, and relatedly, is the concern that the NIDS will fail to effectively
meet its objectives.94 Although the cards will make use of biometric data,
making forgery more difficult for terrorists and other threats to national
particular purposes during war, in times when the war is past, except that technically a state of
war exists, tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers, which is a most undesirable state
of affairs. Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that
exists between the police and the public and such action tends to make the people resentful of
the acts of the police and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of to assist them."). Id.
at 851-52.
88 Davies, supra note 1.
89 Id
90 Id.
9' Hickman, supra note 81; Blunkett Says Wants UKID cards in Three Years, supra note 81;
Harrison, supra note 82; ID Cards "Not a Panacea "for Terrorism - UK Minister, supra note
82.
" Michael Holden, Britain's ID Card Plan to Cost Billions of Pounds, REUTERS NEWS,
Oct. 9, 2006.
93 Id.
9' Philip Johnston, Identity Cards Still Won't Work Home Front, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Dec. 6, 2004, at 19 (noting that "[dietermined terrorists.... will not be prevented from carrying
out their activities"). See also Britain-Clarke Admits Identity Cards Will Not Prevent Future
Terrorist Bombings, MORNING STAR (U.K.), July 9, 2005.
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
security," critics fear that most professionals will still be able to obtain fake
identification cards.96 Thus, according to critics, the benefits of the card do not
justify the millions of pounds to be spent on compulsory identification cards. 97
The third reason for dwindling public support of Britain's Identity Cards
Act, and the most important for purposes of this Note, is the effect such a
scheme will have on individual privacy rights.9" A number of watch groups,
including the Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International,
have taken a strong stance against the Identity Cards Act because of concerns
with individual privacy.99 Many British subjects share the same concerns. Io"
Given the extensive amount of information collected on the national database
under the plan, critics fear the Identity Cards Act is yet another step in the
direction of "Big Brother" surveillance and fear the watchful eye of a
totalitarian government.'0 '
4. The Response of Other Governmental Entities
As public support for the Identity Cards Act dwindled, so did that of
Parliament and other government agencies. 10 2 Information Commissioner
Richard Thomas has publicly attacked the scheme because of the extensive
scope of the information to be recorded, and its possible implications for data
protection laws.'0 3 Even the House of Lords/House of Commons Joint
9 Matar, supra note 10, at 315.
96 See Johnston, supra note 94; Britain-Clarke Admits Identity Cards Will Not Prevent
Future Terrorist Bombings, supra note 94.
97 Holden, supra note 92 ("The Cards... have drawn much criticism, ... with opponents
saying they will be... a costly flop.").
98 UK's Blair Wins Key Vote on Identity Cards, REUTERS NEWS, Dec. 20, 2004 ("[C]ritics
say [ID cards] pose a dangerous threat to civil liberties.").
9 See National ID Cards and REAL ID Act, supra note 1; Davies, supra note 1.
'00 UK. 's Blair Wins Key Vote on Identity Cards, supra note 98.
101 Id
102 See, e.g., Patrick Wintour, ID Cards Will 'Reveal Details of Daily Life,' GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 28, 2005 (the Identity Cards Act has been criticized by the Information
Commissioner); HOUSE OF LORDS-HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMrrrEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
IDENTITY CARDS BrIL, 2004-5, H.C. 283.
103 INFO COMM'RS OFF., THE IDENTITY CARDS BILL-THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERS
CONCERNS (Oct. 2005) ("The Information Commissioner is concerned that the extensive
personal information retained on the proposed National Identity Register and the requirement
on individuals to keep notifying changes is excessive and disproportionate.... The system of
operation envisaged by the Government raises additional serious concerns."), available at http://
www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/detailed-specialist-guides/id-cards bill_-
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Committee on Human Rights, which examines every bill presented to
Parliament, expressed deep concerns that the proposed Bill violated a notion
of individual privacy."0 4
Thus, public opinion on individual privacy in the United Kingdom is
somewhat mixed, with little or no resistance historically to privacy-stripping
security measures on the one hand, and a deep hesitation when it comes to
national identity cards on the other. As public opinion polls and government
reports show, many British subjects and government officials are wary of the
Identity Cards Act.
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Convention
The European Convention on Human Rights, which has been incorporated
by Parliament into domestic United Kingdom Law, °5 includes within its
various protections a specific enforceable right to privacy.'0 6 That right,
enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention, reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.'07
_ico concerns_october_2005.pdf.
0'4 HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 102.
101 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
'" ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.
107 Id.
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
B. Article 8 Interferences (Triggers)
In interpreting Article 8 of the Convention, the European Court of Human
Rights has interpreted "private life," a respected right which all people should
enjoy, to include activity that occurs within the home and to which people have
a reasonable expectation of privacy,'l8 as well as personal information which
people consider private.'09
With regard to personal information, the European Court of Human Rights
has specifically held that the gathering and recording of personal data by
government agencies alone triggers rights under Article 8 of the Convention." 0
According to the court, the use and disclosure of such information implicates
Article 8 rights as well."' The court has construed information relating to
private life very broadly," 2 and has held that the collection of even publicly
available information, which may include a person's name, residence and other
identifying characteristics, implicates the right to privacy, when the
information is "systematically collected and stored."' '" In addition, the court
applies a somewhat heightened standard of review when there has been an
infringement of the right to privacy that involves particularly personal data
such as medical records. 1
4
108 See, e.g., Elahi v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 20 (2007) (explaining covert
listening device placed in citizen's home implicates Article 8 right to respect for private life
concerns).
109 See, e.g., Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 72 (2007) (storage of secret
information about citizens by the police interferes with Article 8 rights); R (on the application
of S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1275 (Eng.) (holding
collecting and maintaining fingerprints and DNA samples of individuals who have not been
criminally convicted interferes with the right to private life).
"0 R (on the Application of S), [2002] EWCA (Civ.) 1275 (recording of personal data
including fingerprints constitutes an interference with Article 8 rights).
1" Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 433 (1987).
112 Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1993) ("The Court does not consider it
possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of 'private life.' However,
it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an 'inner circle' in which the individual may live
his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world.").
113 Rotaru v. Romania, 8 B.H.R.C. 43, 43 (2000) ("[P]ublic information can fall within the
scope of private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities.
That is all the truer where such information concerns a person's distant past.").
114 Z v. Findland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 371 (1997) ("[T]he protection of personal data, not least
medical data, is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect
for private and family life.").
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On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed the
issue of national identification cards in the past."5 According to the court, the
issue of an identity card containing only a person's name, sex, date and place
of birth, current address, and the name of their spouse does not in itself
concern the right to private life under Article 8.116 Furthermore, the obligation
to hold or carry such a card is an insufficient intrusion to trigger Article 8
analysis."'
Once a possible infringement of Article 8 rights has been identified, the
European Court of Human Rights undertakes analysis under Article 8.2 to
determine if such interference isjustified." 8 This analysis contains three steps:
(1) whether the interference is in accordance with the law; (2) whether the
interference serves one of the legitimate aims specifically listed in Article 8.2;
and (3) whether the interference is necessary and proportionate to the aim it
seeks to serve." 9
C. "In Accordance with the Law"
First, the European Court of Human Rights will find a violation of Article 8
where the interference with the privacy right is not in accordance with the
law.'20 This analysis actually contains two steps. First, the court looks to
domestic law to determine whether a particular interference is authorized. 2'
Simply put, the Court looks for a statute or common law principle that
specifically authorizes the challenged activity.'22 If no such authorization can
be found-or worse, there is a specific law or regulation forbidding the
activity1-the interference will be held a violation of Article 8.124 Moreover,,
"' Reyntjens v. Belgium, 73 D.R. 136, 152 (1992).
116 Id.
117 Id.
... To see how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 8.2, see Leander
v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, T 48 (1987).
1 Leander, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433.
120 Id.
121 See Elahi v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 20 (2007) (explaining use of covert
listening devices not in accordance with the law because there exists no legally binding publicly-
accessible body of law regulating such activity); Pisk-Piskowski v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 92/03,
28 (2005) (stating censorship of convict's letters not in accordance with the law because Polish
law provides a clear prohibition against such censorship).
122 See Elahi, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 20.
123 See Pisk-Piskowski, Eur. Ct. H.R. 92/03, 28.
124 Elahi, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 20.
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where there is statutory or other authorization for the conduct, the Court of
Human Rights will also undertake analysis of the nation's Constitution or other
charter document to determine if the authorization is compatible.'25
In contrast, the second line of inquiry under "in accordance with the law"
jurisprudence can invalidate challenged interferences regardless of whether
they are authorized by statute. 26 According to the court, "in accordance with
the law" not only requires the impugned measure have some basis in domestic
law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should
be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee
its consequences for him, and be compatible with the rule of law.'27 Further,
the court explains "that a rule is 'foreseeable' if it is formulated with sufficient
precision to enable any individual - with appropriate advice if need be - to
regulate his conduct."' 28  Thus, the court held that interference with the
correspondence of death row inmates was not sufficiently foreseeable under
a statute authorizing regulation of correspondence of those sentenced to
imprisonment.'29 With regard to interferences that may be conducted in secret,
such as undercover surveillance or wiretaps, foreseeability is arguably not
possible because the persons whose rights are being interfered with may be
unaware of the activity. However, the court places specialized restrictions on
government actors in such situations. 30 Because secret surveillance is not
open to scrutiny by the individuals whose interests are being invaded, legal
discretion to conduct such surveillance may not be expressed in terms of
2' See, e.g., Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 42 (2006).
126 See, e.g., Dankevich v. Ukraine, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 157 (2003) (although restrictions
on correspondence by incarcerated persons were specifically authorized by statute, it was not
foreseeable that the measure applied to persons awaiting execution).
127 Segerstedt-Wiberg, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 42; Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433,
450, 51 (1987) ("[T]he requirement of foreseeability in the special context of secret controls
of staff in sectors affecting national security cannot be the same as in many other fields....
Nevertheless, . . . the law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate
indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the public authorities
are empowered to resort to this kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with private
life.").
128 Rotaru v. Romania, 8 B.H.R.C. 43, 55 (2000).
129 Dankevich, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 156 ("The Court considers that it is not clear that
persons sentenced to death are included among persons sentenced to imprisonment within the
meaning of the Code, a death sentence being imposed because the offender is deemed incapable
of reform through imprisonment.").
130 See Rotaru, 8 B.H.R.C. 43, 55.
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"unfettered power." ''  Rather, the law must clarify the scope of the power to
conduct such surveillance in order to protect against arbitrary interference.' 32
D. Legitimate Aims
Once satisfied that a measure is in accordance with the law, The European
Court of Human Rights next inquires into whether the interference with the
privacy right serves one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8.2. '
According to Article 8.2, a measure that interferes with the right to privacy is
onlyjustified if it advances one of the following interests: (1) national security;
(2) public safety or the economic well-being of the country; (3) prevention of
disorder or crime; or, (4) protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'3 4
The court is traditionally deferential to lawmakers and policymakers'
justifications for such measures, placing little scrutiny on the given statutory
aims.'35 Thus, the collection of DNA and fingerprint samples was held to be
for the legitimate purpose of prosecuting and preventing crime.'36 Also,
forbidding a husband in jail from corresponding with his wife, who was
suspected of being involved in the alleged crime for which he was being
detained, was justified by the aims of securing the conduct of criminal
proceedings and eliminating the risk of collusion, and was held to fall within
the scope of prevention of disorder or crime, although the measure was
invalidated for other reasons."'
E. "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
Finally, although a particular measure may satisfy the court as serving a
legitimate aim, the measure may nevertheless be invalidated if it is not
"necessary in a democratic society."'3 The court has interpreted this to mean
131 Id.
132 Id.
' Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 48(1987).
134 ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.2.
135 See, e.g., Klamecki v. Poland (No. 2), 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 147 (2003); R (on the
application of S) v. ChiefConstable of South Yorkshire, [2002] EWCA (Civ.) 1275, 34 (2002)
(Eng.).
136 R (on the application of S), [2002) EWCA (Civ.) 1275, 39.
137 Klamecki, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 47 (explaining that although this case involved the right
to respect for correspondence, another Article 8 right, the analysis is the same as if the measure
implicated the right to respect for private life).
3 ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.2.
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that the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim, with invasion
of privacy rights to the minimum degree necessary to further the goal.' In
other words, it must be shown that the aim could not be achieved by less
intrusive means. 140 Thus, the court held that the collection of fingerprint and
DNA samples for the purpose of prosecuting and preventing crime had no
adverse consequences to the individual disproportionate to the public
benefit. 4 ' On the other hand, refusing to allow a jail inmate to correspond
with his wife, albeit for the proper purpose of preventing collusion, was held
to be a disproportionate interference with the right to respect for
correspondence.142 Given the extreme intrusion, the court admonished the
authorities for not considering alternative means.
4 3
IV. GREAT BRITAIN'S NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SCHEME:
THE IDENTITY CARDS ACT 2006
A. Background
Britain's Identity Cards Act 2006 has been long in the making. Although
not introduced to the public until after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, a NIDS for the United Kingdom had been under way since 1999, when
the Home Office began creating a prototype.' In 2003, Home Secretary
David Blunkett first announced the proposal to introduce a British NIDS linked
to a national identity database, the National Identity Register.'45 The scheme
has been strongly advocated by Prime Minister Tony Blair, who claims the
scheme is essential in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal
immigration. 146
The British Identity Cards Act met with strong resistance in Parliament,
particularly from the Liberal Democrats and a large part of the Labour party,
147
139 Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 58 (1987) ("The notion of necessity implies
that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.").
140 Id.
141 R (on the application of S), [2002] EWCA (Civ.) 1275, 42.
"' Klamecki, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 152 (2003).
143 Id.
'44 Melissa Kite, National ID Card Ready After Secret Trial, TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 1, 2001,
at 2.
145 Davies, supra note 1.
146 Britain's Ambitious ID Card Plan Comes Under Attack, supra note 6.
147 Harrison, supra note 82.
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but was finally passed and entered the statute book on March 30, 2006 as the
Identity Cards Act 2006.48
B. The National Identity Register and "Registrable Facts"
The Act creates a National Identity Register to be maintained by the Home
Office, and to include certain information on each registered British subject. 4 9
The purposes of the Act include maintaining secure and reliable records,
providing a convenient way for individuals to prove facts to others who require
such proof, and providing a secure and reliable way to verify such facts
whenever it is necessary in the public interest. 50 Thus, information may not
be recorded, used or disclosed unless it is necessary in the public interest,
which includes the following purposes: (1) "in the interests of national
security"; (2) "for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime"; (3)
"for the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls"; (4) "for the
purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working or
employment"; and (5) "for the purpose of securing the efficient and effective
provision of public services." 5
The "registrable fact[s]" eligible for recording on the Register include basic
identity information, current and previous addresses, current residential status,
all previous residential statuses, identification numbers, and "information
about occasions on which the information recorded about [an individual] in the
Register has been provided to any person." ' Included within the category of
basic identity information are full name, gender, date and place of birth, date
of death, and any external characteristics capable of identification.'53 In
addition, the database will also contain biometric information such as
fingerprints and iris scans."' All of this information may be maintained on the
Register for as long as is consistent with the statutory purposes.1
55
148 Davies, supra note 1.
14 Identity Cards Act, 2006, c. 15, § 1(1) (Eng.).
150 Id. § 1(3).
151 Id. § 1(4).
152 Id. § 1(5).
153 Id. § 1(7).
'4 Id. §§ 5(4), 5(5), 7(3), 7(4) (indicating that once an individual becomes eligible and
required to enter on the Register, he must allow his fingerprints and other biometric information
about himself to be taken and recorded).
," Id. § 3(1)(b).
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C. Entry on the Register
There are three methods whereby information may be recorded on the
Register. First, entitled individuals may apply to be entered on the Register.
5 6
Second, information from other sources capable of being recorded on the
Register can be automatically recorded.'57  Third, information about
individuals may be recorded on the Register when they apply for designated
documents such as passports or driver's licenses.'58
D. Disclosure of Information Contained on the Register
According to the Act, information contained on the Register can be
disclosed to various government agencies such as the Secret Intelligence
Service and local law enforcement.'59 Also, the Act stipulates that regulations
may make provision of public services conditioned on producing one's
identification card. 160 Furthermore, the Act gives the Secretary of State power
to extend the scope of eligible persons to whom information contained on the




Because the NIDS will ultimately take several years to fully come into
effect, identification cards will initially be introduced on a voluntary basis.1
62
Beginning in 2008, all applications for new passports will require the
collection of registrable data, including biometric information, and the
issuance of an identification card.'63 Stand alone identification cards will
eventually become compulsory for all British subjects over the age of
sixteen." The Act makes it clear, however, that British subjects will not be
156 Id. § 2(1).
157 Id. § 2(4).
158 Id. § 4.
159 Id. §§ 17(2)(b), 17(3).
16 Id. § 13(1).
161 Id. § 20(2).
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According to the Identity and Passport Service, the NIDS entails numerous
and wide ranging benefits, both for society as a whole and for the individual.
66
Among these benefits, the NIDS is expected to help protect cardholders against
identity theft and fraud, provide a secure way of making financial transactions,
and help to confirm eligibility for public services. 167 The benefits to society
include helping to prevent organized crime and terrorism, combating illegal
working, reducing illegal immigration into the United Kingdom, and allowing
police to more quickly identify suspects and people they arrest.
161
Despite apparent confidence in these benefits, the British government has
publicly admitted overselling the advantages of the system. 69 Tony McNulty,
the Home Office Minister in charge of the project at the time, admitted that
previous suggestions that the cards "may well be a panacea for identity fraud,
benefit fraud, terrorism, and entitlement and access to public services," was a
bit hasty, and that the government had wrongfully inflated the benefits of the
plan in its enthusiasm to promote the scheme. 70
V. ANALYSIS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Article 8 Interference
Great Britain's Identity Cards Act raises serious concerns under the
European Convention on Human Rights. First, the Act's interference with the
right to privacy is likely sufficient to warrant consideration under Article 8 of
165 Identity Cards Act, § 16.
6 Home Office, What are the Benefits of the National Identity Scheme?: Benefits at a
Glance, http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/benefits-glance.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
167 Id.; see also Home Office, Using the Scheme in Daily Life, http://www.ips.gov.uk/iden
tity/how-idcard-daily.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2008) (envisioning the use of identity cards and
the accompanying personal identification number, similar to a credit card PIN number, in such
routine daily activities as proving one's age to purchase alcohol, collecting a parcel, and
transferring money).
168 What are the Benefits Of the National Identity Scheme?, supra note 166.
169 ID Cards "Not a Panacea "for Terrorism - UK Minister, supra note 82.
170 Id.
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the Convention. Although the mere issuance of an identification card does not
engage Article 8,7' the European Court of Human Rights has never addressed
a NIDS quite like that envisioned by the Identity Cards Act. A NIDS
previously accepted by that court involved the collection and storage of only
a person's name, sex, date and place of birth, current address, and the name of
their spouse, 172 whereas Britain's Identity Cards Act is much more intrusive.
The Identity Cards Act allows for the collection of various private facts on
the Register. 17 3 When systematically collected and stored in one central place,
the culmination of these private facts can be very intrusive into a person's
private life. By far the most intrusive of these is "information about occasions
on which information recorded about [an individual] has been provided to any
person."' 74 This can include information on when the entry has been accessed
by various government officials as well as public service providers,175 thus
leading to a detailed account of an individual's private life. For example,
information can be provided to local law enforcement agencies in the course
of routine criminal investigations, and can conceivably be maintained on the
Register whether or not the individual has ever been convicted or even charged
with a crime. 17
6
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the gathering of
personal data, even publicly available information when it is systematically
collected and stored, triggers scrutiny under Article 8 of the Convention. 
77
Therefore, the significant amount of information to be contained on the
Register is likely a sufficient privacy invasion for Article 8 analysis.
Furthermore, because holding information about a person's distant past has
been held to raise particular privacy concerns, 78 the statutory language that
allows information to be kept on the Register for as long as it is consistent with
statutory purposes 17 is likely to concern the court. This could conceivably be
a person's entire life. In addition, because the court has held that the use or
17' Reyntjens v. Belgium, 73 D.R. 136, 152 (1992).
172 Id.
'71 Identity Cards Act, 2006, c. 15, § 1(5) (Eng.).
174 Id. § 1(5)(i).
175 Id. §§ 13, 17.
176 Id. § 17(3).
177 Fried] v. Austria, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 83, 52 (1995); Rotaru v. Romania, 8 B.H.R.C. 43,
44 (2000).
178 Rotaru, 8 B.H.R.C. 43, 55.
179 Identity Cards Act, 2006, c. 15, § 13(1)(b) (Eng.).
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disclosure of information also triggers Article 8,"80 the use and disclosure of
information contained on the Register will do the same.
B. "In Accordance with the Law"
Second, the Identity Cards Act is likely not in accordance with the law.
Although the Act is itself a statutory authorization and thus actions taken
pursuant to it will be lawful in that respect, the European Court of Human
Rights requires more than mere compliance with domestic law.'8 1 Because the
law must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable as to put individuals on notice
of its application to them,8 2 the Identity Cards Act is likely to fail this prong
of the analysis. Because information can be both entered into the Register and
disclosed to third persons without the individual's consent or knowledge, 83 the
individual may be unaware that his privacy rights are being infringed. Also,
because the Secretary of State has the power to expand the scope of persons
eligible to receive information contained on the Register,' 84 the extent to which
an individual's privacy is invaded is also unclear. The European Court of
Human Rights is especially cautious when covert surveillance such as this is




The Identity Cards Act is likely to pass muster under the third inquiry in the
Article 8 analysis. The European Court of Human Rights requires that all
interferences with the privacy interest be justified by legitimate government
interests as described in Article 8.2.186 The Identity Cards Act lists five
statutory purposes, all of which would likely satisfy the court. The statutory
purposes "in the interests of national security" 8 7 and "regarding the prevention
or detection of crime"'' 8 8 track closely the language of Article 8.2, which lists
1 0 Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 1 48 (1987).
"'l Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2006).
182 Id.
"' Identity Cards Act, §§ 2(4), 17, 18.
184 Id. § 20(2).
"' Rotaru v. Romania, 8 B.H.R.C. 43, 55 (2000).
186 ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.2.
187 Identity Cards Act, § 1(4)(a).
18 Id. § 1(4)(b).
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the goals of national security and crime prevention as legitimate aims. 8 9 "For
the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls"'90 would likely
satisfy the court as being related to national security. The remaining
justifications, "for the purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions on
unauthorised working or employment"' 9' and "for the purpose of securing the
efficient and effective provision of public services"' 92 are more difficult to
justify, but the Court may conceivably accept these as furthering the goal of
economic well-being. 193
D. "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
Even if the court accepts the justifications for the Identity Cards Act as
legitimate, the Act is still subject to scrutiny under the fourth and final prong
of the analysis-whether the interference is "necessary in a democratic
society," '194 or in other words, necessary and proportionate. 95 For several
reasons, the court is unlikely to hold the invasion of privacy envisioned by the
Identity Cards Act as either necessary or proportionate to the attainment of the
stated goals.
First, the Act demands collection of too broad a range of information. The
British government has been unable to advance any important reasons for
requiring individuals to record certain information on the Register, such as all
previous residences and all prior residential statuses. 196  The range of
information to be contained on the Register is not proportionate to the stated
goals of national security and crime prevention. Second, it is difficult to
justify a scheme whereby interference with Article 8 privacy rights depends on
whether an individual needs a new or renewed passport.' 97 Because the
scheme will be phased in by first requiring all persons applying for designated
documents to register, the interference with the privacy right is
disproportionate to the goal. Third, the Act envisions a broad array of
information to be disclosed to a wide range of persons and agencies, including
189 ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.2.
'90 Identity Cards Act, § 1(4)(c).
'9' Id. § l(4)(d).
'92 Id. § 1(4)(e).
'" ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.2.
194 Id.
" Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 48 (1987).
'96 Identity Cards Act, § 1(5)(c)(g).
" How the National Identity Scheme will Get Started, supra note 8.
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local law enforcement and the providers of public service benefits.'98 Because
some of the information provided will be irrelevant to the purposes of the
agencies, the interference with the privacy rights greatly exceeds that
necessary to accomplish the goals.
Finally, as some critics have pointed out, concerns over whether the NIDS
will work to effectively reach the goals of national security and the prevention
of crime.99 also raise questions of proportionality under Article 8. Critics
charge that a NIDS in other European countries such as France, Spain and Italy
have failed to stop terrorist attacks.200 According to Lord Carlile, Britain's
reviewer of terrorism legislation, identity cards would only have "limited
value" and would not have prevented the London subway bombing in July.201
According to a recent report by Privacy International, two-thirds of all
terrorists in history have operated under their true identity.2"2 Thus, identity
cards would have little preventative effect.20 3 Other terrorists use a wide range
of techniques to forge identities, and would likely be able to penetrate the
system anyway.2°4 Given the marginal utility of a NIDS such as Britain's
Identity Cards Act, the interference with the right to privacy is highly
disproportionate to any benefits that may be realized.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expansive NIDS envisioned by the United Kingdom's Identity Cards
Act is a dangerous intrusion upon civil liberties in the name of national
security. The scheme violates a notion of privacy that has grown within the
United Kingdom, with the latest and largest protection coming less than a
decade ago.205 The proposed policy is also contrary to the principles laid out
"9 Identity Cards Act, §§ 13, 17.
199 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 94.
200 Hickman, supra note 81.
201 Success of ID Cards Questioned by Govt Reviewer, REUTERS NEWS, Jan. 29, 2006.
202 PRIVACY INT'L, MISTAKEN IDENTITY; EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEENNATIONAL
IDENTITY CARDS & THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 2 (2004) (also noting that "[a]t a theoretical
level, a national identity card as outlined by the UK government could only assist anti-terrorism
efforts if it was used by a terrorist who was eligible and willing to register for one, if the person
was using their true identity, and if intelligence data could be connected to that identity"),
available at http://www.privac yinternational.org/issues/idcard/UK/id-terrorism.pdf.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
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by the European Convention on Human Rights2° 6-rights that are considered
so fundamental in the United Kingdom that they were incorporated into
domestic law.20 7
The possible privacy implications posed by the United Kingdom's Identity
Cards Act are breathtaking. It is not difficult to imagine the public response
that would follow if the United States were to propose legislation such as the
Identity Cards Act. Yet, this scenario may not be merely a hypothetical one,
even with the America's strong legal culture of safeguarding individual privacy
rights. As it has in most other countries, the possibility of a NIDS has been
discussed in the United States extensively in the years since September 11.208
Any country faced with the decision of whether to implement a NIDS must
take into account both the interests of national security and individual privacy
rights. Opposition to a NIDS should in no means be taken to demean the
important government interest in national security. Most reasonable people
would agree that national security is one of the most important goals of any
civilized society. However, this interest must be weighed against the interest
of privacy. Privacy is generally considered to be such an important
fundamental right that it has been recognized in almost every civilized country
as well as in various international agreements, such as the European
Convention on Human Rights.0 9
In a democratic society, the fundamental interests of privacy need not be
sacrificed in the name of national security. Prior to September 11, 2001,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair once voiced his objection to a NIDS, saying
"[i]nstead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID
cards.., the money [should] provide thousands more police officers on the
beat in our local communities. '' 210 Although this statement was made before
the age of global terrorism, the same principle can be applied today: let the
money provide better airport security, tighter border control, and more
stringent immigration laws. These are options that would be much less
206 ECHR, supra note 27.
207 See Human Rights Act, 1998.
20 See, e.g., Serge Egelman & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Federal Secrecy After September 11 and
the Future of the Information Society: The Real ID Act: Fixing Identity Documents with Duct
Tape, 2 J.L. & POL'Y INFO. SOC'Y 149 (2006) (discussing the Real ID Act, federal legislation
designed to reform the drivers' licensing systems of all states in order to make the process more
secure as well as uniform across America, and its implications for privacy including the
observation that the Act will create a de facto National ID card).
209 See Privacy & Human Rights 2003: Overview, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
20 Davies, supra note 1.
[Vol. 36:443
2008] BIG SUCCESS OR "BIG BROTHER'?" 473
invasive to the individual right to privacy. It is true that none of these methods
would be foolproof. In fact, most countries have implemented these measures
in the years following September 11, and none of them can be said to be
completely protected from terrorist attacks or other grave breaches of national
security. However, the same could be said of a NIDS. Even taking into
consideration the thoroughness and breadth of the United Kingdom's scheme,
there is no such thing as a perfect NIDS. Given that, it is difficult to justify the
additional privacy interference posed by a NIDS.
As the United Kingdom goes forward with its national ID cards, it is
imperative that United States legislators and policymakers take advantage of
the valuable insight such an experiment can have on this country's own debate.
Only time will tell whether the United Kingdom's Identity Cards Act will
prove successful at combating terrorism and achieving its other goals, or
whether it will lead to abuses of power and grave breaches of the right to
privacy far exceeding the scope of its original purpose.

